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For ﬁrms with responsive preferences, we prove that the set of
stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to any ﬁrm quasi-
stable matching has a lattice structure. This follows from a general-
ization of the Decomposition Lemma. The result does not hold when
ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences. Nevertheless, we show that
the set of stable matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a
ﬁrm quasi-stable matching contains an element which is unanimously
least preferred by workers, and most preferred by ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm
quasi-stable matching is fed into our extension of the Deferred Accep-
tance algorithm (where ﬁrms propose), the existence of this matching
guarantees the success of the algorithm.
1 Introduction
The Deferred Acceptance (D.A.) algorithm is a central mechanism in the
study of the school choice problem, and, in general, of centralized and de-
centralized matching markets. Remarkably, the constructive features of the
algorithm, introduced in Gale and Shapley (1962), have been used in numer-
ous proofs and have provided a deep insight to the understanding of these
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1markets. The D.A. algorithm is also often used in real life applications, where
variations from the original matching problem matter.
One challenge is to extend it so as to take into account complementaries
between agents (the problems of couples, ...). The mechanism designed for
the National Resident Matching Market does so (as reported in Roth and
Peranson (1999)). The task, however, is not entirely overcome since the
procedure might not ﬁnd an existing stable matching (See Klaus, Klijn and
Massó (forthcoming)).
In this paper, we deal with another issue. Speciﬁcally our ﬁrst objective
is to understand the conditions of workability of the D.A. algorithms when
the outcome matching is neither (1) the worker-best and ﬁrm-worst stable
matching, nor (2) the worker-worst and ﬁrm-best stable matching.
The issue is relevant in decentralized markets. It is also motivated by
situations where the designer does not want to privilege either side of the
market. Blum, Roth and Rothblum (1997) for one-to-one markets, and Can-
tala (2004) for many-to-one markets (when ﬁrms have q-substitutable pref-
erences), show that their adapted versions of the D.A. algorithm where ﬁrms
make oﬀers always produce a stable matching when the input is ﬁrm quasi-
stable. A contribution of these papers is that outcome matchings might be
neither (1) nor (2).
As mentioned in Knuth (1976)1, in one-to-one markets the set of stable
matchings has a lattice structure, with intuitive partial orders. In particular
if workers (ﬁrms) do not agree comparing two stable matchings, letting work-
ers (ﬁrms) choose their worse (favorite) match leads to a stable matching.
Example 5 in Martinez, Massó, Neme and Oviedo (2001) shows that there is
no such structure in many-to-one markets when ﬁrms have q-substitutable
preferences2. However, within the set of stable matchings preferred by work-
ers to a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching, it exists an element which is ﬁrm-best
and worker-worst. We argue that this is the key property for the workability
of the D.A. Algorithm with ﬁrms proposing. This matching is the outcome of
the algorithm. An implication of the characterization is that feeding D.A. al-
gorithms with all possible ﬁrm quasi-stable matchings does not allow to reach
all existing stable matchings since, in particular, stable matchings that can-
1This result is attributed by Knuth to Conway.
2Blair (1988) establishes the lattice structure under substitutability but with unnatural
least upper and lower bounds. Other references on the lattice structure in many-to-one,
many-to-many markets and more restricted preferences are Baiou and Balinsky (1998),
Alkan (1999 and 2001), Martinez et al. (2000), Echenique and Oviedo (2004 and 2006).
2not be ordered unanimously by ﬁrms, or workers, are not outcomes of the
procedure.
Our second objective is to extend to many-to-one markets when ﬁrms
have responsive preferences the analysis performed by Blum et al. (1997)
on the opposition of interest between ﬁrms and workers. In particular we
show that the Decomposition Lemma (Knuth 1976)3 extends with a group
stable matching and a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching where blocking coalitions
involve workers individually less preferred than each of the ﬁrm’s matches.
Interestingly, the extension of the Decomposition Lemma does not deal with
an isomorphism anymore. It is suﬃcient to establish that the set of stable
matchings unanimously preferred by workers to a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching
has a lattice structure with natural partial orders, a result established in
Blum at al. (1997) in a one-to-one setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model,
Section 3 is dedicated to the lattice analysis while our characterization result
is stated in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The market
There are two disjoint ﬁnite sets of agents F and W. The set of ﬁrms
is F = {f1,...,fm} and W = {w1,...,wn} is the set of workers; generic
ﬁrms and workers will be denoted by f and w, respectively. A quota is the
maximal number of workers that can be matched to ﬁrm f, it is denoted
qf and q = (qf)f∈F is the vector of quota associated to each ﬁrm. Each
ﬁrm f has a strict, transitive and complete preference relation ￿f over the
family of subsets of workers 2W, where the empty set is interpreted as ﬁrm
f not being assigned to any worker. If a ﬁrm prefers remaining single than
being assigned to a subset, it ranks the empty set higher than the subset.
Each worker w has a strict, transitive and complete preference relation ￿w
over the set F ∪ {∅}. We interpret the empty set as w being unemployed.
Preference proﬁles are (m + n)-tuples of preference relations and they are
represented by ￿= (￿f1,...,￿fm,￿w1,...,￿wn). A many-to-one market is a
quadruple (F,W,q,￿). We use the notation ￿f (respectively ￿w) when
3See subsection 3.2.
3ﬁrm f (respectively worker w) compares two subsets of workers (respectively
ﬁrms) possibly equal and thus, indiﬀerent.
For any ﬁrm f we deﬁne the acceptable set of f under q and ￿ to be the
subsets of workers with cardinality smaller or equal to qf, strictly preferred
to the empty set; namely
Af (qf,￿f) ≡ {S ⊆ W | S ￿f ∅ and |S| ≤ qf}.
Subsets in Af (qf,￿f) are called acceptable. Since only acceptable subsets
will matter, we will represent the preferences of ﬁrms as a list of acceptable
subsets. Likewise, for any w we deﬁne the acceptable set of w under ￿ to
be the set of ﬁrms strictly preferred to ∅, it is denoted Aw (￿w). Firms in
Aw (￿w) are called acceptable. We will represent the preferences of ﬁrms and
workers by ordered lists of acceptable partners. A pair (f,w) is acceptable
under q and ￿ if both agents are mutually acceptable.
The problem consists in matching each ﬁrm f with a subset of workers
with cardinality smaller or equal to the quota qf, keeping track with the
reciprocal nature of the relation: a worker is matched to a ﬁrm if and only if
this ﬁrm is matched to this worker. Finally, ﬁrms and workers may remain
single.
Deﬁnition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set F ∪ W into the set
of all subsets of F ∪ W such that for all f ∈ F and w ∈ W:
(1) µ(f) ∈ 2W and |µ(f)| ≤ qf,
(2) either |µ(w)| = 1 and µ(w) ∈ F, or µ(w) = ∅,
(3) µ(w) = f if and only if w ∈ µ(f).
Condition 1 says that a ﬁrm will be either matched to a subset of workers
whose cardinality is at most equal to its quota or it will remain single. As
for condition 2, a worker is either matched to a ﬁrm or is single. Condition
3 establishes the reciprocal nature of the relationship. The number of free
positions of a ﬁrm f at µ is qf − |µ(f)|.
Given two matchings µ and µ￿, µ ￿W µ￿ means that all workers w ∈ W
either are matched to the same ﬁrm at µ and µ￿, or prefer µ(w) to µ￿ (w).
Similarly µ ￿F µ￿ means that all ﬁrms f ∈ F either are matched to the
same subset of workers at µ and µ￿, or prefer µ(f) to µ￿ (f). Given a set
of matchings M, whenever they exist we denote by µWM the worker-worst
matching in M (i.e., µ ￿WµWM for all µ ∈ M) and ¯ µWM the worker-
optimal matching in M (i.e., ¯ µWM ￿W µ for all µ ∈ M); similarly, µFM is
the ﬁrm-worst matching in M and ¯ µFM is the ﬁrm-optimal matching in M.
42.2 Stability
Let ￿ be a preference proﬁle. Given a set S ⊆ W, let the Choice of ﬁrm f
be f ’s most preferred subset of S with cardinality at most qf according to
its preference ordering ￿f; namely, Ch(S,qf,￿f) = S￿, where S￿ ⊆ S such
that |S| ≤ qf and S￿ ￿f ￿ S for all ￿ S ⊆ S such that ￿ S ￿= S￿ and
￿ ￿ ￿￿ S
￿ ￿ ￿ ≤ qf.
A matching µ is blocked by a worker w if she prefers remaining alone than
being matched to µ(w); i.e., ∅ ￿w µ(w). Similarly, µ is blocked by a ﬁrm f
if µ(f) ￿= Ch(µ(f),qf,￿f). A matching is individually rational if it is not
blocked by any individual agent. A matching is blocked by a worker-ﬁrm pair
(w,f) if w prefers being matched to f than to µ(w) and f would like to hire
w; i.e., f ￿w µ(w) and w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ {w},qf,￿f).
Deﬁnition 2 A matching µ is pair-wise stable if it is not blocked by any
individual agent or any worker-ﬁrm pair.
We denote by PS (F,W,q,￿) the set of pair-wise stable matchings of market
(F,W,q,￿).
Let S be a subset of W. A matching µ is blocked by a workers-ﬁrm
coalition (S,f) if all workers w in S prefer being matched to f than to µ(w)
and ﬁrm f would like to hire S; formally, if for all w ∈ S, f ￿w µ(w) and
S ⊆ Ch(µ(f) ∪ S,qf,￿f). We say that (S,f) forms a blocking coalition
of µ. Let Wf,µ be the set of workers who prefer f to their match under µ
and, thus, are potential members of blocking coalitions of µ; i.e., Wf,µ =
{w ∈ W | f ￿w µ(w)}. We denote by Bµ the set of blocking coalitions of µ
and by Bf,µ the set of blocking coalitions of µ which involve f.
Deﬁnition 3 A matching µ is group-stable if it is not blocked by any indi-
vidual agent or by any workers-ﬁrm coalition.
We denote by GS (F,W,q,￿) the set of group-stable matchings of market
(F,W,q,￿). Obviously, if a matching is group-stable it is also pair-wise
stable.
A ﬁrm quasi-stable matching is a matching that is not blocked by any
individual agent and has no workers-ﬁrm blocking coalition which implies
ﬁring workers.
Deﬁnition 4 A matching µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable if it is individually rational
and for any ﬁrm f, worker w ∈ µ(f) and subset of workers S ⊆ Wf,µ,
w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ S,qf,￿f).
5We denote by FQS (F,W,q,￿) the set of ﬁrmquasi-stable matchings of mar-
ket (F,W,q,￿). When, moreover, blocking coalitions (S,f) involve workers
individually less preferred by f than its matches, those matchings are called
W-ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Deﬁnition 5 A matching µ is W-ﬁrm quasi-stable if:
(1) it is ﬁrm quasi-stable, and
(2) for all matches w of ﬁrm f (w ∈ µ(f)), and all workers w￿ involved
with f in blocking coalitions ((S,f) ∈ Bµ), w ￿f w￿.
We denote by W−FQS (F,W,q,￿) the set of W-ﬁrmquasi-stable match-
ings of market (F,W,q,￿).
2.3 Restriction on the preferences of ﬁrms
We introduce now alternative restrictions of ﬁrms’ preferences on subsets of
workers.
Deﬁnition 6 A ﬁrm f’s preference ordering ￿f satisﬁes responsiveness if
(1) for all S and w / ∈ S, S ∪ {w} ￿f S ⇔ {w} ￿f ∅ and
(2) for any two subsets of workers S and S￿ such that S = (S￿\{w￿})∪{w}
for two distinct workers w / ∈ S and w￿ ∈ S￿, S ￿f S￿ ⇔ {w} ￿f {w￿}.
In words, a ﬁrm has responsive preferences if they are separable and if
for any two sets of agents deferring only with respect to one worker, the ﬁrm
prefers the one with the individually most-preferred worker. A preference
proﬁle ￿ is responsive if for each ﬁrm f, the preference ordering ￿f satisﬁes
responsiveness.
We recall the deﬁnition of q-substitutable preferences.4
Deﬁnition 7 A ﬁrm f’s preference ordering ￿f satisﬁes qf-substitutability
if for any set of workers S containing w and w￿, w ￿= w￿, if w ∈ Ch(S,qf,￿f)
then w ∈ Ch(S\{w￿},qf,￿f).
A preference proﬁle ￿ is qf-substitutable if for each ﬁrm f, the preference
ordering ￿f satisﬁes q-substitutability.
Finally, Remark 1 below relates the two classes of preferences.
4Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduce the notion of substitutable preferences, adapted
to markets whithout money by Roth (1984) and to the case where ﬁrms face quota re-
strictions by Cantala (2004).
6Remark 1 Responsive preferences are q-substitutable.
Remark 2 Under q-substitutability the set of pairwise-stable matchings and
group-stable matchings coincide. Moreover these matchings are called stable.
3 The lattice structure of the set of stable
matchings in the re-stabilized market
When ﬁrms have responsive preferences, we prove that the set of stable
matchings which are at least as good for all workers as a W-ﬁrm quasi-
stable matching is a sublattice of the set of stable matchings. In general, a
set of matchings M has a lattice structure if there exists a partial order ￿
and two binary operations ∨ and ∧ on M such that, for all µ1, µ2, ν ∈ M,
the following properties hold:
(1) µ1 ∨ µ2 ∈ M,
(2) µ1 ∧ µ2 ∈ M,
(3) µ1 ∨ µ2 ￿ µ1 and µ1 ∨ µ2 ￿ µ2,
(4) µ1 ￿ µ1 ∧ µ2 and µ2 ￿ µ1 ∧ µ2,
(5) [ν ￿ µ1 and ν ￿ µ2] =⇒ [ν ￿ µ1 ∨ µ2],
(6) [µ1 ￿ ν and µ2 ￿ ν] =⇒ [µ1 ∧ µ2 ￿ ν].
Conditions (1) and (2) say that ∨ and ∧ are binary operations on M.
Conditions (3), (4), (5) and (6) say that µ1∨µ2 and µ1∧µ2 are, respectively,
the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound of µ1 and µ2 according
to the partial order ￿. The quadruple (M,￿,∨,∧) is called a lattice on M.
Let (M,￿,∨,∧) be a lattice and M￿ ⊆ M. The quadruple (M￿,￿,∨,∧)
is a sublattice on M￿ of (M,￿,∨,∧) if µ1,µ2 ∈ M￿ imply µ1 ∨ µ2 ∈ M￿
and µ1 ∧ µ2 ∈ M￿. Notice that (M￿,￿,∨,∧) is itself a lattice on M￿ after
restricting ￿, ∨ and ∧ to the set M￿.
3.1 Binary operators and q-substitutable preferences
Given two matchings µ and µ￿ in (F,W,q,￿), we deﬁne the function µ∨W µ￿
on F ∪ W as follows:
a- µ ∨W µ￿ (w) =
￿
µ(w) if µ(w) ￿w µ￿ (w)
µ￿ (w) otherwise, for all w ∈ W,
b- µ ∨W µ￿ (f) = {w ∈ W | µ ∨W µ￿ (w) = f} for all f ∈ F.
7Namely, µ∨Wµ￿ is the matching obtained from µ and µ￿ by letting workers
choose their best ﬁrm. Similarly, by letting workers choose their worst ﬁrm,
we deﬁne the function µ ∧W µ￿ on F ∪ W.
Theorem 1 says that, under q-substitutable preferences of the ﬁrms, if
we let each worker w choose the best ﬁrm between the two ﬁrms assigned
to w at two ﬁrm quasi-stable matchings, the result of all choices is a ﬁrm
quasi-stable matching.
Theorem 1 Let (F,W,q,￿) be a many-to-one matching market. Assume
￿ is q-substitutable and let µ,µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿). Then µ ∨W µ￿ ∈
FQS (F,W,q,￿).
Proof. Assume that ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences and let µ,µ￿ ∈
FQS (F,W,q,￿). First, we prove that µ∗ = µ ∨W µ￿ is a matching. Each
worker in µ∗ is trivially matched to at most one ﬁrm. We have to prove that
for any ﬁrm f, |µ ∗ (f)| ≤ qf. Suppose on the contrary that there exists at
least one ﬁrm f such that |µ ∗ (f)| > qf. Let
W (f) = {w ∈ µ ∗ (f) | µ ∗ (w) = µ(w)} and
¯ W (f) = µ ∗ (f)\W (f).
For any ﬁrm f ∈ F, note that µ ∗ (f) = W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f); moreover, since
µ(f) ⊇ W (f) and Wf,µ ⊇ ¯ W (f), µ(f) ∪ Wf,µ ⊇ W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f). Because
µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable, w ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ Wf,µ,qf,￿f) for all w ∈ µ(f), in
particular for all w ∈ W (f). Thus, by q-substitutability of ￿f, withdrawing
one-by-one from µ(f)∪Wf,µ all workers who do not belong to W (f)∪ ¯ W (f),
w ∈ Ch
￿
W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f),qf,￿f
￿
for all w ∈ W (f). (1)
A similar argument can be developed with µ￿ to show that
¯ w ∈ Ch
￿
W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f),qf,￿f
￿
for all ¯ w ∈ ¯ W (f). (2)
By (1) and (2), W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f) = Ch
￿
W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f),qf,￿f
￿




W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f),qf,￿f
￿￿ ￿ ≤ qf by deﬁnition of the Choice,
and
￿ ￿W (f) ∪ ¯ W (f)
￿ ￿ = |µ ∗ (f)| > qf by assumption.
Second, we prove that µ∗ is ﬁrm quasi-stable. Suppose that it is not the case,
namely there exist a ﬁrm f, a set of workers S ⊆ Wf,µ∗∪{∅} and w∗ ∈ µ∗(f)
8such that w∗ / ∈ Ch(µ ∗ (f) ∪ S,qf,￿f). Without loss of generality suppose
that w∗ ∈ µ(f). Note that f ￿w µ(w) and f ￿w µ￿ (w) for all w ∈ S. Let
Wf
µ = {w ∈ W | w ∈ µ ∗ (f) ∩ µ(f)},
W
f
µ￿ = {w ∈ W | w ∈ µ ∗ (f) ∩ µ￿ (f)} and
¯ Wf
µ = {w ∈ W | w ∈ µ(f) and w / ∈ µ ∗ (f)}.
Thus µ(f) ∪ W
f
µ￿ = ¯ W f
µ ∪ µ ∗ (f). If w∗ / ∈ Ch(µ ∗ (f) ∪ S,qf,￿f) then, by
q-substitutability of ￿f
5, including one-by-one to µ ∗ (f) ∪ S all workers in
¯ Wf
µ, w∗ / ∈ Ch( ¯ W f
µ ∪µ∗(f)∪S,qf,￿f) = Ch(µ(f)∪W
f
µ￿ ∪S,qf,￿f). Since
all workers w ∈ (W
f
µ￿ ∪ S) prefer f to µ(w), W
f
µ￿ ∪ S ⊆ Wf,µ, thus µ is not
ﬁrm quasi-stable, in contradiction with our hypothesis.
Blum et al. (1997) shows that, if instead of choosing their favorite ﬁrm,
workers choose the ﬁrm they like less, the result of all choices may not be a
matching. Neither the procedure always induces a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching
if we let ﬁrms choose, instead of workers. Since these lattice operators do
not lead to a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching in their one-to-one market, neither
do they in our many-to-one market. The possibility of deﬁning alternative
binary operations and a partial order to provide the set FQS (F,W,q,￿)
with a lattice structure remains open. However, we are able to proceed with
the binary operation ∨W, assuming that ﬁrms have responsive preferences.
3.2 Opposition of interest between ﬁrms and workers
when ﬁrms have responsive preferences
The Decomposition Lemma is a key result in the literature of matching mar-
kets. It says that the two sides of the markets have an opposition of interest
in the following sense. Consider two group-stable matchings, µ an µ￿, and let
F (µ,µ￿) be the set of ﬁrms which prefer their matches at µ to their matches
at µ￿ and W (µ￿,µ) be the set of workers who prefer their match at µ￿ to their
match at µ; then µ and µ￿ are isomorphisms between F (µ,µ￿) and W (µ￿,µ).
Blum et al. (1997) generalize the Decomposition Lemma and show that the
opposition of interest between ﬁrms and workers still holds if one consider,
to make a comparison, a group-stable and a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching and
the ﬁrms considered do not block the ﬁrm quasi-stable matching. Their
statement, adopted to our setting, is as follows.
5We use here the contrapositive statement of the deﬁnition of q-substitutability.
9Lemma 1 (Blum et al. (1997)) Consider a market (F,W,q,￿) where qf =
1 for all f ∈ F. Let µ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) and µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿) and
deﬁne F (µ,µ￿) to be the set of ﬁrms such that µ(f) ￿f µ￿ (f) and f does
not belong to any blocking pair for µ￿ and deﬁne W (µ￿,µ) to be the set of
workers w such that µ￿ (w) ￿w µ(w). Then both µ and µ￿ are isomorphisms
between F (µ,µ￿) and W (µ￿,µ).
To generalize Lemma 1 to our many-to-one market when ﬁrms have re-
sponsive preferences, we use Lemma 1 and consider each position of the ﬁrms
as a ﬁrm with quota one, creating a related one-to-one market. We also relate
the stability concepts in one-to-one markets and many-to-one markets.6
3.2.1 Stability concepts in many-to-one markets and their related
one-to-one markets
Given a many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿), we introduce (Fr,Wr,￿r), the
related one-to-one market of (F,W,q,￿) where each ﬁrm fj is replaced by
qj ﬁrms fj1,...,fjqj sharing the same preferences ￿j.
Deﬁnition 8 The market (Fr,Wr,￿r) is the related one-to-one market of a
many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿) if
(1) for all fj ∈ F there are qfj ﬁrms fj1,...,fjqfj
∈ Fr,7
(2) Wr = W,
(3) ￿fj=￿fjk for all fjk, 1 ≤ k ≤ qfj,
(4) for all w ∈ Wr, fjl ￿w fj￿
l￿ ⇔
￿
fj ￿w fj￿ if j ￿= j￿,
l < l￿ otherwise.
We get rid of indiﬀerences of workers with respect to the replicated ﬁrms
by assuming that workers prefer replicated ﬁrms with a smaller index. The
advantage of this modelization is that, given a group-stable matching µ
in (F,W,q,￿), there exists a unique corresponding stable matching ¯ µ in
(Fr,Wr,￿r).
6It is an usual and fruitful procedure, when one studies the lattice structure of many-to-
one markets and ﬁrms have responsive preferences, to introduce such a related one-to-one




10Deﬁnition 9 Let (Fr,Wr,￿r) be the related one-to-one market of the many-
to-one market (F,W,q,￿) and µ a matching in (F,W,q,￿). We say that
the matching ¯ µ in (Fr,Wr,￿r) corresponds to µ if
(1) for all w ∈ W, [w ∈ µ(fj)] ⇔ [w = ¯ µ(fjk) for one k, 1 ≤ k ≤ qfj],
(2) for all fj ∈ F, w, w￿ ∈ µ(fj) such that w ￿fj w￿, then ¯ µ(w) = fjk
and ¯ µ(w￿) = fjl where k < l,
(3) for all fj ∈ F, w ∈ µ(fj), if |µ(fj)| < qfj, then ¯ µ(fjk) = w and
¯ µ(fjl) = ∅ ⇐⇒ k ≤ |µ(fj)| < l ≤ qfj.
As for (1), if a worker is matched to a ﬁrm at µ, it is matched to one
of its replicated ﬁrm at ¯ µ; (2) says that preferred workers are matched to
replicated ﬁrms with lower index; ﬁnally (3) speciﬁes that, whenever the
quota of a ﬁrm is not reached, unmatched replicated ﬁrms at ¯ µ are the ones
with higher index.
We recall in Remark 3 that, when ﬁrms have responsive preferences,
group-stability and pair-wise stability coincide. Moreover, a many-to-one
matching is pair-wise stable if and only if its corresponding matching is pair-
wise stable.8
Remark 3 Let (Fr,Wr,￿r) be the related one-to-one market of the many-to-
one market (F,W,q,￿), when ﬁrms have responsive preferences GS(F,W,
q,￿) = PS(F, W,q,￿). Moreover, a matching µ is pair-wise stable in the
many-to-one market if and only if its corresponding matching in its related
one-to-one market is pair-wise stable .
We will see in Example 1 that there is no such coincidence with ﬁrm quasi-
stability. When a matching µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable in a many-to-one market,
ﬁrms do not want to ﬁre workers to hire other workers. More speciﬁcally
when ﬁrms have responsive preferences, a matching is ﬁrm quasi-stable if for
all ﬁrms f, the number of free positions is greater or equal to the number of
workers w￿: a- who block the matching with f and b- such that w￿ is preferred
to at least one match of f. To adapt the same idea to the related one-to-
one market and corresponding matchings µ, for any ﬁrm fj and worker w in
µ(fj), if w is the ist most-preferred worker in µ(fj) ∪ Bf,µ for fj, then a- if
i ≤ qfj worker w is matched at µ to the the replicated ﬁrm fji, b- if i > qfj
worker w is unmatched at µ. If all workers matched at µ are still matched at
8See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the proofs of both statements.
11µ after this reshuﬄing, no worker is ﬁred in the related matching if blocking
pairs are completed. Such matchings are said to be B-ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Deﬁnition 10 Let ¯ µ be a matching in a related one-to-one market (Fr,Wr,
￿r). We call ¯ µS the shuﬄed matching of ¯ µ relative to S = {S1,...,Sm} where
Sj ⊆ W for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, where




w if w ∈ ¯ µ(fjt) for one t ≤ qj, k ≤ qj and w is the kth most-
preferred worker of ﬁrm j in
￿






We denote by ¯ µB the shuﬄed matching of ¯ µ relative to the set of blocking
coalitions of the ﬁrms at µ, i.e. when for any replicated ﬁrm fj ∈ F, Sj = ￿
w ∈ W | (w,fj) ∈ Bfj,µ
￿
. We introduce now formally the concept of B-
ﬁrm quasi-stability, which corresponds, for related one-to-one markets, to
the concept of ﬁrm quasi-stability in many-to-one markets.
Deﬁnition 11 A matching ¯ µ in a related market (Fr,Wr,￿r) is B-ﬁrm
quasi-stable if
1- it is individually rational and
2- all matched workers at ¯ µ are also matched at ¯ µB.
We exhibit an example of a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching in a many-to-
one market (F,W,q,￿) whose related matching ¯ µ is B-ﬁrm quasi-stable in
(Fr,Wr,￿r) but not ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Example 1. Consider the market (F,W,q,￿) where F = {f1}, W =
{w1,w2,w3}, qf1 = 3, and ￿ is the preference proﬁle where the ﬁrm is ac-
ceptable to all workers and ￿f1 is any preference over subsets of W responsive








Since the preferences of the ﬁrm is responsive and all workers are acceptable,
{w1,w2,w3} = Ch(µ(f1) ∪ {w2},3,￿f1) and therefore Bµ = {(w2,f1)}.
Thus µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable in (F,W,q,￿). The corresponding matching
in the related market is
¯ µ =
￿
f11 f12 f13 ∅
{w1} {w3} ∅ {w2}
￿
.




f11 f12 f13 ∅
{w1} ∅ {w3} {w2}
￿
.
This matching is B-ﬁrm quasi-stable in the related market since ¯ µB (w1) = f11
and ¯ µB (w3) = f13, namely w1 and w3 are still matched at ¯ µB. Nevertheless
it is not ﬁrm quasi-stable since (w2,f13) is a blocking pair and f13 is matched
at ¯ µ.
Next Lemma establishes the equivalence, under responsive preferences, of
ﬁrm quasi-stability in (F,W,q,￿) and B-ﬁrm quasi-stability in (Fr,Wr,￿r).
Lemma 2 Assume that ﬁrms have responsive preferences. A matching µ is
ﬁrm quasi-stable in a many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿) if and only if ¯ µ,the
corresponding matching in the related one-to-one market (Fr,Wr,￿r), is B-
ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Proof. Suppose that µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable. Since ﬁrms have responsive
preferences, it means that for each ﬁrm f, the number of free positions at µ
is greater or equal to the number of workers w￿ who block µ with f such that
w￿ ￿f w for at least one w ∈ µ(f). Thus any worker matched at µ will be
matched at ¯ µB, that is to say that ¯ µ is B-ﬁrm quasi-stable.
If µ is not ﬁrm quasi-stable, there exists at least one worker w, a set S ⊆
Wf,µ ∪ {∅} and one ﬁrm f such that w / ∈ Ch(µ(f) ∪ S,qf,￿f). Since ￿f is
responsive, it means that in µ(f) ∪ Bf,µ there are qf workers preferred to w
or it is not individually rational. Thus w is not matched at ¯ µB in the related
one-to-one market or ¯ µB is not individually rational, as a consequence, ¯ µ is
not B-ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Lemma 2 implies that Lemma 1 cannot be generalized straightforwardly
to many-to-one markets. Nevertheless we are not interested in any ﬁrm
quasi-stable matchings. Our objective is to study matchings induced by
the disruption of stable matchings due to the retirement of workers or the
increase of quotas of the ﬁrms. When ﬁrms have responsive preferences, the
disrupted matching is W-ﬁrm quasi-stable in the new market.9 Next Lemma
9To see it, assume otherwise, i.e., there exists a blocking pair (w,f) of the disrupted
matching µ and a worker ¯ w ∈ µ(f) such that w ￿f ¯ w. By responsiveness of ￿f, (w,f)
would also be a blocking pair of the original matching in the original market, a contradic-
tion.
13establishes that a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching in a many-to-one market
corresponds to a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching in its related one-to-one market.
Lemma 3 Assume that ﬁrms have responsive preferences. A matching µ is
W-ﬁrm quasi-stable in a many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿) if and only if ¯ µ,
the corresponding matching in the related one-to-one market (Fr,Wr,￿r), is
ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Proof. We observe ﬁrst that individual rationality coincides in both markets.
Suppose that µ is W-ﬁrm quasi-stable, then for any blocking pair (w￿,f) and
w ∈ µ(f), w ￿f w￿ holds. In ¯ µ, the corresponding matching in the related
one-to-one market, preferred workers w are matched to the ﬁrst replicated
ﬁrms. Thus these ﬁrms prefer their match to worker w￿. As a conclusion ¯ µ
is ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Suppose that ¯ µ is ﬁrm quasi-stable, then any blocking pair involves un-
matched ﬁrms. Consequently, by ﬁrm quasi-stability of ¯ µ, for any two repli-




= ∅, and there




is a blocking pair of ¯ µ, ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk w for any
k￿ ≤ k. Namely, in the many-to-one market, matched workers are preferred
to the workers belonging to blocking pairs. Since preferences are responsive,
µ is W-ﬁrm quasi-stable.
Lemma 3 establishes, when ﬁrms have responsive preferences, the equiv-
alence of W-ﬁrm quasi-stability in many-to-one markets and ﬁrm quasi-
stability in the related one-to-one markets. Thus, to generalize Lemma 1
to many-to-one markets, where we deal with W-ﬁrm quasi stable matchings,
we will use Lemma 1 in related one-to-one markets.
3.2.2 Generalization of the Decomposition Lemma
Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 specify the opposition of interest, between ﬁrms
and workers, when they compare two matchings: one group-stable and the
other one W-ﬁrm quasi-stable. Lemma 4 says that, if a ﬁrm prefers a group-
stable matching to a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching and it is not involved in
any blocking coalition, then it prefers individually all workers of the group-
stable matching to any worker it is matched to at the W-ﬁrm quasi-stable
matching. Moreover, at both matchings the quota of the ﬁrm is ﬁlled.
14Lemma 4 Assume that ﬁrms have responsive preferences. Let µ ∈ GS(F,W,
q,￿) and µ￿ ∈ W −FQS (F,W,q,￿). If ﬁrm f does not belong to any block-
ing pair of µ￿ and µ(f) ￿f µ￿ (f), then w ￿f w￿ for any w and w￿ such that
w ∈ µ(f) and w￿ ∈ µ￿ (f)\µ(f). Moreover |µ(f)| = |µ￿ (f)| = qf.
Proof. Let µ ∈ GS(F,W, q,￿) and µ￿ ∈ W − FQS (F,W,q,￿). Let ¯ µ
and ¯ µ￿ be the matchings corresponding to µ and µ￿ in the related one-to-one
market. By Remark 2 and Lemma 3, ¯ µ is pair-wise stable and ¯ µ￿ is ﬁrm quasi-
stable. We observe ﬁrst that, by responsiveness, for all ﬁrms fj ∈ F which
prefer µ(fj) to µ￿ (fj), there exists in the related one-to-one market at least
one replicated ﬁrm fjk which prefers ¯ µ(fjk) to ¯ µ￿ (fjk) (otherwise f cannot
prefer µ to µ￿). Let k1 be the smallest index k for which ¯ µ(fjk) ￿fjk ¯ µ￿ (fjk)
for ﬁrm fj. Moreover, by Remark 2 again, if a ﬁrm does not belong to any
blocking pair of µ￿ in the many-to-one model, neither do its replicated ﬁrms
in the related one-to-one market.
Let W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) be the set of workers who prefer ¯ µ￿ to ¯ µ; formally
W (¯ µ
￿, ¯ µ) ≡ {w ∈ Wr | ¯ µ
￿ (w) ￿w ¯ µ(w)}.
Let F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) be the set of ﬁrms which prefer ¯ µ￿ to ¯ µ and are not involved at
¯ µ￿ in any blocking pair; formally
F (¯ µ, ¯ µ
￿) ≡ {f ∈ Fr | ¯ µ(f) ￿f ¯ µ
￿ (f) and ￿ w such that (w,f) ∈ B¯ µ￿}.
We prove now the following Claims.
C￿￿￿￿￿ Let ¯ µ ∈ PS (Fr,Wr,￿) and ¯ µ￿ ∈ FQS (Fr,Wr,￿). If for k1 above
deﬁned, ¯ µ(fjk1) ￿fjk1 ¯ µ￿(fjk1) and the replicated ﬁrms of fj do not belong to
any blocking pair of ¯ µ￿ then:
￿. ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) for all k￿ ≥ k1,
￿. ¯ µ(fjk￿) = µ￿(fjk￿) for all k￿ < k1,
￿. |µ(fj)| = |µ￿ (fj)| = qfj.
Proof of Claims ￿ and ￿.
Since ¯ µ(fjk1) ￿fjk1 ¯ µ￿(fjk1) and fjk1 does not belong to any blocking pair of
¯ µ￿, fjk1 ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), and by Lemma 1, both ¯ µ(fjk1) and ¯ µ￿(fjk1) belong to
W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Let w￿ ≡ ¯ µ￿(fjk1). We observe that w￿ can be of two types:
Type 1 µ(w￿) ￿= µ￿(w￿) (namely µ(w￿) is not a replicated ﬁrm of fj).
15Since w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ), i.e. fjk1 = ¯ µ￿(w￿) ￿w￿ ¯ µ(w￿), for any fjk￿ with higher
index than k1 (qfj ≥ k￿ > k1), fjk￿ ￿w￿ ¯ µ(w￿). It implies that ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk￿ w￿
for any such fjk￿, otherwise ¯ µ would not be pair-wise stable. Hence ﬁrms fjk￿
are matched at ¯ µ, which means in the many-to-one market that |µ(fj)| = qfj.
We have just established that ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk￿ w￿ for all k￿ > k1. Moreover,
w￿ = ¯ µ￿(fjk1) ￿fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) by deﬁnition of ¯ µ. Thus ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) for
all k￿ > k1. Since these replicated ﬁrms do not block ¯ µ￿, they do belong to
F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿). By Lemma 1, they are matched at ¯ µ￿, as a conclusion |µ￿ (fj)| = qfj.
Type 2 µ(w￿) = µ￿(w￿).
Since µ(w￿) = µ￿ (w￿) and w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ), w￿ is matched at ¯ µ to a replicated
ﬁrm of fj with a higher index than fjk1, i.e., ¯ µ(w￿) ≡ fjk￿￿ where k￿￿ > k1. We
observe that, by deﬁnition of ¯ µ, for all k, k1 < k < k￿￿, ¯ µ(fjk) ￿fjk ¯ µ(fjk￿￿) =
w￿ and w￿ = ¯ µ￿(fjk1) ￿fjk ¯ µ￿ (fjk), that is why ¯ µ(fjk) ￿fjk ¯ µ￿ (fjk). Since
these fjk do not block ¯ µ￿, fjk ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), which means that they prefer ¯ µ to
¯ µ￿ and that they are matched at ¯ µ and ¯ µ￿ by Proposition 1. We still have to
prove the same for replicated ﬁrms with higher index than k￿￿.
Since w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ), by Lemma 1, fjk￿￿ ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) and, in turn, w￿￿ ≡
¯ µ￿(fjk￿￿) ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Thus we can reiterate the analysis we have just devel-
oped with fjk￿￿ and w￿￿ instead of fjk1 and w￿, until ﬁnding a worker of type
1. To see that, observe that at least the worker matched to fjqfj is of type 1;
let ˆ w ≡ ¯ µ￿(fjqfj). By Lemma 1 , ˆ w ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Thus ˆ w cannot be matched
to a replicated ﬁrm of fj with a higher index, hence it is of type 1. This
concludes the proof of Claims ￿ and ￿.
Proof of Claim ￿.
Assume by contradiction that for some k￿ < k1, ¯ µ(fjk￿) ≺fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) (by
deﬁnition of k1 it cannot be the reverse). Let k2 be the smallest k￿ such that
¯ µ(fjk￿) ≺fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿). By ￿, all ﬁrms are matched at ¯ µ and ¯ µ￿, let w ≡ ¯ µ(fjk2).
Since fjk2 is not involved in any blocking pair of ¯ µ￿ and ¯ µ(fjk2) ≺fjk2 ¯ µ￿(fjk2),
Lemma 1 tell us that w prefers ¯ µ to ¯ µ￿ (otherwise fjk2 would prefer ¯ µ(fjk2)
to ¯ µ￿(fjk2)). We observe that all replicated ﬁrms fjk￿￿ such that k￿￿ ≥ k1 are
matched at ¯ µ￿ to workers worst than w since for all fjk￿￿, w = ¯ µ(fjk2) ￿fjk￿￿
¯ µ(fjk1) and ¯ µ(fjk1) ￿fjk￿￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk1).
Nevertheless no pair (w,fjk￿￿) blocks ¯ µ￿. Thus w is not matched at ¯ µ￿ to a
replicated ﬁrm of fi, i ￿= j: otherwise, if w was matched at ¯ µ￿ to a replicated
ﬁrm of fi, since ¯ µ(w) ￿w ¯ µ￿ (w), she would form a blocking pair with one
16fjk￿￿. Hence there exists k￿ > k2 such that ¯ µ￿ (w) = fjk￿.
It implies for k2 + 1 that ¯ µ(fjk2+1) ≺fjk2+1 ¯ µ￿(fjk2+1) since ¯ µ(fjk2+1) ≺fjk2+1
¯ µ(fjk2) = w and w = ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) ￿fjk2+1 ¯ µ￿(fjk2+1).
We can iterate our analysis and conclude that for any k1 > k > k2, worker
¯ µ(fjk) is matched at ¯ µ￿ to a ﬁrm fjk￿ with k￿ > k and ¯ µ(fjk+1) ≺fjk+1 ¯ µ￿(fjk+1).
In particular, this holds for worker ¯ µ(fjk1−1), which implies that ¯ µ(fjk1) ≺fjk1
¯ µ￿(fjk1), in contradiction with our hypothesis. This concludes the proof of
Claim ￿.
We still have to show that w ￿fj w￿ for any w and w￿ such that w ∈ µ(fj)
and w￿ ∈ µ￿ (fj)\µ(fj). By Claims ￿, ￿ and ￿, either ¯ µ(fjk￿) = ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) or
fjk￿ ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿). Thus, for all w ∈ µ(fj) ∪ µ￿ (fj), either ¯ µ(w) = ¯ µ￿ (w) or
w ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ), by Lemma 1. Suppose that there is one w ∈ µ(fj) and w￿ ∈
µ￿ (fj)\µ(fj) such that w ≺fj w￿. Since w￿ / ∈ µ(fj), ¯ µ(w￿) ￿= ¯ µ￿(w￿), hence
w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). By responsiveness of ￿fj, individual rationality of µ and since
w ≺fj w￿, (w￿,fj) is a blocking pair of µ, a contradiction. As a conclusion
w ￿fj w￿ for any w and w￿ such that w ∈ µ(fj) and w￿ ∈ µ￿ (fj)\µ(fj).
To emphasize the fact that in Lemma 4 we cannot dispense of the hy-
pothesis that ﬁrms have responsive preferences, we observe that, when ﬁrms
have q-substitutable preferences, a ﬁrm may have a free position at a stable
matching and ﬁll its quota at another stable matching.
Example 2. Let the market (F,W,q,￿) be such that F = {f1,f2,f3},
W = {w1,w2,w3,w4}, qf1 = qf2 = 2, qf3 = 1 and ￿ is the q-substitutable
preference proﬁle deﬁned by
￿f1= {w1,w2} {w1} {w2} {w3,w4} {w3} {w4},










f1 f2 f3 ∅









17Notice that |µ1 (f3)| = qf3, and µ1 (f3) ￿f3 µ2 (f3), nevertheless |µ2 (f3)| <
qf3.
Proposition 1 generalizes Lemma 1. If a ﬁrmprefers a group-stable match-
ing to a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching where it is not involved in any block-
ing pair, then the ﬁrm’s mates at both matchings either prefer the W-ﬁrm
quasi-stable matching or they are matched to the ﬁrm at both matchings.
Nevertheless, workers who are indiﬀerent between a group-stable matching
and a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matchings may be matched to ﬁrms involved in
blocking coalitions. Thus, the isomorphism described in Lemma 1 does not
hold in many-to-one markets.
Proposition 1 Assume that ﬁrms have responsive preferences. Let µ ∈
GS (F,W,q,￿) and µ￿ ∈ W − FQS (F,W,q,￿).
(1) If µ(f) ￿f µ￿ (f) and f ∈ F does not belong to any blocking pair of µ￿,
then µ(w) ￿w µ￿(w), for all w ∈ µ(f) ∪ µ￿ (f).
(2) If µ￿ (w) ￿w µ(w) for one w ∈ W, then µ(f) ￿f µ￿ (f) and f does not
belong to any blocking pair of µ￿ for all f ∈ µ(w) ∪ µ￿ (w).
Proof. Let µ and µ￿ be two matchings in (F,W,q,￿), respectively group-
stable and W-ﬁrm quasi stable. Let ¯ µ and ¯ µ￿ be the matchings that cor-
respond to µ and µ￿ in the related one-to-one market. By Remark 2 and
Lemma 3, ¯ µ is pair-wise stable and ¯ µ￿ is ﬁrm quasi-stable. Let W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) ≡
{w ∈ Wr | ¯ µ￿ (w) ￿w ¯ µ(w)), and F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) ≡ {f ∈ Fr | ¯ µ(f) ￿f ¯ µ￿ (f) and
there is no w such that (w,f) ∈ B¯ µ￿}.
(1) Suppose that µ(f) ￿f µ￿(f) and f does not belong to any blocking
coalition of µ￿. Lemma 4 says that for any w ∈ µ(f) and w￿ ∈ µ￿ (f)\µ(f),
w ￿f w￿. It implies that in the related one-to-one-market every replicated
ﬁrm of f belongs to F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) or has the same match. By deﬁnition of ¯ µ and
¯ µ￿, only the best favorite workers of f in µ(f)∪µ￿ (f), if any, are matched at
¯ µ and ¯ µ￿ to the same replicated ﬁrm; obviously these workers are indiﬀerent
between both matchings. For other workers, the fact that f ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) and
Lemma 1 insure that w and w￿ belong to W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Thus, in the many-to-one
model, if µ(w) ￿= µ￿ (w) (namely if worker w is not matched to two replicated
ﬁrms fjk and fjk￿), µ(w) ≺w µ￿ (w), other workers are indiﬀerent between
both matchings. This concludes the proof of (1).
(2) Suppose that µ￿ (w) ￿w µ(w). then in the related one-to-one market,
¯ µ￿ (w) ￿w ¯ µ(w). Thus w ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). By Lemma 1, the replicated ﬁrms
18fjk ≡ ¯ µ(w) and fil ≡ ¯ µ￿ (w) belong to F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), in particular they do not
block ¯ µ￿. We prove that the original ﬁrms fj and fi prefer µ to µ￿ and do not
belong to any blocking pair at µ￿.
a- We deal ﬁrst with fi. Since ¯ µ is pair-wise stable and w is not matched
at ¯ µ to a replicated ﬁrm fil￿ of fi (otherwise w would be indiﬀerent between




￿fil￿ w; in particular for all w￿ ∈ µ(fi),
w￿ ￿fil w. Hence ﬁrms fil￿ are matched at ¯ µ to workers w￿, which implies in
the many-to-one market that |µ(fi)| = qfi.




￿fil￿ ¯ µ￿ ￿
fil￿
￿
for all fil￿ by showing that for all w￿ ∈
µ(fi), w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) or ¯ µ(w) = ¯ µ￿ (w￿).
Since fil ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), fil is not involved in any blocking pair of ¯ µ￿, in particular
with the workers w￿ ∈ µ(fi), which means that ¯ µ￿ (w￿) ￿w￿ fil for all w￿ ∈
µ(fi). Three cases are possible.
C￿￿￿ 1 ¯ µ(w￿)=¯ µ￿ (w￿).
In this case, her match is also indiﬀerent between ¯ µ and ¯ µ￿. Note that these
workers are the best workers for fi in µ(fi) ∪ µ￿ (fi).
C￿￿￿ 2 ¯ µ(w￿)=fht, h ￿= i.
Then fh ￿w￿ fi, w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) and her match belongs to F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) by Lemma
1.
C￿￿￿ 3 ¯ µ￿ (w￿)=fi˜ l, ˜ l ￿= l￿.
We prove that ˜ l < l￿. Suppose on the contrary that there exists w￿ such that
¯ µ(w￿) = fil￿, ¯ µ￿ (w￿) = fi˜ l and ˜ l > l￿ (if there are many such w￿ we consider
the favorite w￿ for fi) and thus w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿). By construction of ¯ µ￿, since
fil is matched at ¯ µ￿ (to w), all ﬁrms fil￿, l￿ < l, are also matched at ¯ µ￿ and,
by ﬁrm quasi-stability of ¯ µ￿, they are not involved in any blocking pair. Let




. We prove that ˜ w is matched at ¯ µ￿ to a ﬁrm fi¯ l, ˜ l < ¯ l < l. Since
w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), we have just seen that all fil￿ are matched at ¯ µ and ¯ µ￿ and
are not involved in any blocking pair of ¯ µ￿, then w￿ = ¯ µ￿ ￿
fi˜ l
￿





Lemma 1. It also implies that ˜ w ∈ W (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿).
Thus ¯ µ( ˜ w) = fi˜ l ￿ ˜ w ¯ µ￿ ( ˜ w), moreover w￿ ￿fil w for all w￿ ∈ µ(fi), in
particular for ˜ w. Hence ˜ w cannot be matched at ¯ µ￿ to a ﬁrm which is not a
replicated ﬁrm of fi; otherwise, (fil, ˜ w) would be a blocking pair of ¯ µ￿. As a
consequence she is matched to fi¯ l, ˜ l < ¯ l < l.
Since we can iterate the analysis with fi¯ l and the following replicated ﬁrms,
one of these workers w￿ will end matched at ¯ µ￿ to fil￿￿, l ≤ l￿￿, in contradiction
19with the fact that ¯ µ￿ (w￿) ￿w￿ fil for all w￿ ∈ µ(fi). As a conclusion if
¯ µ￿ (w￿) = fi˜ l, ˜ l ￿= l, then ˜ l < l￿.
It implies that w￿ ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) and, by Lemma 1, ¯ µ(w￿) ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿).




￿fil￿ ¯ µ￿ ￿
fil￿
￿
holds with strict inequality
at least for l, µ(fi) ￿fi µ￿ (fi) by responsiveness of the preferences. Moreover,




= ¯ µ￿ ￿
fil￿
￿
or w ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Lemma 1 tells us that
in the second case, fil￿ ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) and consequently fil￿ is also matched at
¯ µ￿. Thus |µ￿ (fi)| = qfi and W-ﬁrm quasi-stability of µ￿ implies that fi is not
involved in any blocking pair of µ￿.
b- We deal now with fj. Since fjk ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿), w￿ ≡ ¯ µ￿ (fjk) belongs to
W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ) by Lemma 1. We observe that ¯ µ(w￿) can be of two types.
Type 1 ¯ µ(w￿) is not a replicated ﬁrm of fj. In this case, the argument and
conclusions drawn for fi hold.
Type 2 fj¯ k ≡ ¯ µ(w￿) is a replicated ﬁrm of fj, ¯ k > k. Note ﬁrst that by
Lemma 1, fj¯ k ∈ F (¯ µ, ¯ µ￿) and ¯ w ≡ ¯ µ￿(fj¯ k) belongs to W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ). Thus, either
¯ w belongs to type 1 and we are done, or ¯ w belongs to type 2 and we repeat
the same argument with ¯ w as with w￿. The number of iterations is ﬁnite since
qfj is ﬁnite, thus at least the worker ˆ w = ¯ µ￿(fjqfj) is of type 1 if ˆ w ∈ W (¯ µ￿, ¯ µ)
(it cannot be matched to a replicated ﬁrm of fj with smaller index).
As a conclusion ¯ µ(fjk￿) ￿fjk￿ ¯ µ￿(fjk￿) for all k￿ with strict inequality at least
for k. By responsiveness of ￿fj, µ(fj) ￿fj µ￿(fj). Since µ￿ is W-ﬁrm quasi-
stable and |µ￿ (fj)| = qfj by conclusions drawn for fi, fj does not belong to
any blocking pair of ¯ µ￿.
We observe in Example 3 that, in Proposition 1, it is necessary to consider
ﬁrms which do not block the W- ﬁrm quasi-stable matching.
Example 3. Let the market (F,W,q,￿) be such that F = {f}, W = {w},













We observe that µ is stable, µ￿ is W-ﬁrm quasi-stable, µ(f) ￿f µ￿(f) and
nevertheless w prefers µ to µ￿.
20Example 4 illustrates the fact that we cannot replace, in part (2) of Propo-
sition 1, W-ﬁrm quasi-stability of µ￿ by just ﬁrm quasi-stability. In particular,
we exhibit a market where µ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿), µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿) and
µ￿ (w) ￿w µ(w) but there exists f ∈ µ(w) ∪ µ￿ (w) with f belonging to a
blocking pair of µ￿.
Example 4. Let the market (F,W,q,￿) be such that F = {f1,f2}, W =
{w1,w2,w3,w4}, qf1 = qf2 = 2, and ￿ is any responsive preference proﬁle
with the property that:
{w1,w2} ￿f1 {w2,w3} ￿f1 {w1,w3} ￿f1 {w2,w4} ￿f1 {w1,w4}
￿f1 {w3,w4} ￿f1 {w2} ￿f1 {w1} ￿f1 {w3} ￿f1 {w4},
{w3,w4} ￿f2 {w2,w3} ￿f2 {w2,w4} ￿f2 {w1,w3} ￿f2 {w1,w4}
















f1 f2 ∅ ∅
{w3} {w2} {w1} {w4}
￿
.
Notice that f1 = µ￿ (w3) ￿w3 µ(w3) and nevertheless f1 belongs to the block-
ing pair (w1,f1) of µ￿.
Finally, we recall an example from Martínez et al. (2001), which shows
that the statement of Proposition 1 does not hold if ﬁrms have q-substitutable
preferences, even if the two matchings that agents have to compare are group-
stable.
Example 5. Let the market (F,W,q,￿) be such that F = {f1,f2}, W =
{w1,w2,w3,w4}, qf1 = qf2 = 2, and ￿ is the q-substitutable preference proﬁle
21deﬁned by:
￿f1= {w1,w2} {w1,w3} {w2,w4} {w3,w4} {w1,w4}
{w2,w3} {w1} {w2} {w3} {w4},
￿f2= {w3,w4} {w2,w4} {w1,w3} {w1,w2} {w1,w4}



















Notice that f1 prefers µ1 to µ2 and is not involved in any blocking pair of µ2,
nevertheless it is matched at µ1 to w3 and at µ2 to w2, who both also prefer
µ1 to µ2.
3.3 Lattice structure
When ﬁrms have responsive preferences, we establish that the set of group-
stable matchings preferred by workers to a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching has
a lattice structure. We see ﬁrst in Theorem 2 below that, if we let each worker
w choose her best ﬁrm between the two ﬁrms assigned to w at a group-stable
and a W-ﬁrm quasi stable matching, the result of all choices is not only a
W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching but even a group-stable one.
Theorem 2 Assume that ﬁrms have responsive preferences. Let µ ∈ GS(F,
W,q,￿) and µ￿ ∈ W −FQS (F,W,q,￿). Then µ∨W µ￿ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿).
Proof. Assume µ and µ￿ satisfy the hypothesis of Theorem 2 and deﬁne
µ∗ = µ∨W µ￿. By Theorem 1, µ∗ is ﬁrm quasi-stable. We have to show that
no ﬁrm belongs to blocking pairs. Let
F (µ,µ￿) ≡ {f ∈ F | µ(f) ￿f µ￿ (f) and ￿ w such that (w,f) ∈ Bµ￿}
and
W (µ￿,µ) ≡ {w ∈ W | µ￿ (w) ￿w µ(w)}.
22Let f ∈ F be arbitrary. There are three possible cases.
C￿￿￿ 1 f ∈ F (µ,µ￿).
By Lemma 4, |µ(f)| = |µ￿ (f)| = qf and the qf workers w matched to f
at µ either belong to W (µ￿,µ) or µ(w) = µ￿ (w). Thus for any w ∈ µ(f),
µ ∗ (w) = µ￿ (w), which implies that µ ∗ (f) = µ￿ (f). Thus, |µ ∗ (f)| = qf.
The ﬁrm quasi-stability of µ∗ assures that f does not belong to blocking
pairs of µ∗.
C￿￿￿ 2 µ(f) ∈ 2W\{∅} and f / ∈ F (µ,µ￿).
By Proposition 1, for any w ∈ µ(f), w / ∈ W (µ￿,µ). Thus µ ∗ (f) = µ(f).
Hence desirable workers for f are the same at µ∗ and µ. By stability of
µ they did not form blocking pairs with the ﬁrms. By deﬁnition of µ∗,
µ ∗ (w￿) ￿w￿ µ(w￿) for all w￿ ∈ W, neither do they at µ∗.
C￿￿￿ 3 µ(f) = ∅.
By stability of µ, any acceptable worker w of f, prefers µ(w) to f. By
deﬁnition of µ∗, µ ∗ (w) ￿w µ(w) for all w ∈ W, still they do not form a
blocking pair with f at µ∗.
Corollary 1 says that, when ﬁrms have responsive preferences, the worker-
optimal stable matching in GS (F,W,q,￿) is preferred by workers to any
W-ﬁrm quasi-stable matching in (F,W,q,￿).
Corollary 1 Let µ￿ ∈ W − FQS (F,W,q,￿) and suppose that ﬁrms have
responsive preferences. Then ¯ µWGS (F,W,q,￿) ￿W µ￿.
Proof. By Theorem 2 µ∗ = µ￿∨W ¯ µW (F,W,q,￿) ∈ PS (F,W,q,￿) and by
optimality of ¯ µW (F,W,q,￿) within PS (F,W,q,￿), ¯ µW (F,W,q,￿) ≥W
µ∗. Hence ¯ µW (F,W,q,￿) ≥W µ∗ ≥W µ￿.
Corollary 1 concludes the analysis which allows us to state that the set
of stable matchings which are preferred by workers to a W-ﬁrm quasi-stable
matching µ￿ is a non-empty sublattice of the set of group-stable matchings
when ﬁrms have responsive preferences. Formally, let S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) ≡
{µ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) | µ ￿W µ￿}.
Theorem 3 Let µ￿ ∈ W − FQS (F,W,q,￿) and ￿ be responsive. Then
S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) is a non-empty sublattice of GS (F,W,q,￿) with the partial
order ￿W and binary operations ∨W and ∧W.
23Proof Corollary 1 shows that the worker-optimal matching is always in
S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿), hence S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) is non-empty. Further, for any two
group-stable matchings µ1 and µ2 in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿), we know that µ1∨W µ2
and µ1∧W µ2 belong to PS (F,W,q,￿). By the worker-wise deﬁnition of ∨W
and ∧W, it follows that µ1∨W µ2 ≥W µ￿ and µ1∧W µ2 ≥W µ￿. So µ1∨W µ2 and
µ1 ∧W µ2 are in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿); in particular S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) with lattice
operators ∨W and ∧W is a sublattice of PS (F,W,q,￿).
This result does not extend to q-substitutable preferences since the set
GS (F,W,q,￿) with ￿W, ∨W and ∧W is not a lattice under this restriction
of preferences.
4 Characterization of the outcome of the SO
Algorithm when ﬁrms have q-substitutable
preferences.
The opposition of interest described in Proposition 1 does not hold with q-
substitutable preferences. However, given a worker quasi-stable matching µ￿,
we establish now that agents unanimously agree on which one is the worker-
worst and ﬁrm-optimal group-stable matching in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿). Moreover,
this is the outcome of the SO Algorithm with input µ￿. We show ﬁrst that,
when ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences, if a group-stable matching is at
least as good for workers as a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching which is used as
input of the SO Algorithm, it is still unanimously preferred by workers to
the outcome of the algorithm.
4.1 The Set Oﬀering Algorithm
We establish in Cantala (2004) that, when ﬁrms have q-substitutable pref-
erences and we use as input a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching, the sequence of
tentative matching produced by the Set Oﬀering Algorithm is composed by
ﬁrm quasi-stable matchings (this version of the algorithm take into account
this property) and the output matching is group-stable.
24The Set Oﬀering Algorithm
I￿￿￿￿
An many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿) and a matching µ￿.
I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
a. µ0 = µ￿ and i := 1.
b. For all f ∈ F set A0
f := Af (qf,￿f)\µ0 (f).
M￿￿￿ I￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1. For all f ∈ F, deﬁne S
i−1
f as the subset of A
i−1
f such that S
i−1
f ⊆
Ch(µi−1 (f) ∪ A
i−1
f ,qf,￿f).
2. If there is no f ∈ F such that S
i−1
f ￿= ∅, stop with output µi−1;
otherwise each ﬁrm f makes oﬀers to workers in S
i−1
f .
3. For all w who received an oﬀer from a ﬁrm at step 2, deﬁne ¯ f as her
favorite ﬁrm within the set of ﬁrms which made her an oﬀer.
4.

    
    
Deﬁne µi by setting for all w who received an oﬀer
µi (w) =
￿
µi−1 (w) if µi−1 (w) ￿w ¯ f,
¯ f otherwise;






f for all ﬁrm f.
5. i := i + 1, go to 1.
Let SO(µ￿) be a the output matching of the S.O. algorithm with input
matching (µ￿) and SO(µ￿)(w) the match of worker w at SO(µ￿).
Proposition 2 Assume that ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences and that
µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿). If µ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) and µ ￿W µ￿, then µ ￿W
SO(µ￿).
Proof. Let µ￿ = µ0, µ1, ... , µk = SO(µ￿) be the sequence of matchings
generated by the SO Algorithm. Assume that µ ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) and that
µ ￿W µ￿. To get a contradiction, assume that there exists a worker w who
prefers her match under SO(µ￿) than under µ. Let i be the ﬁrst matching in
the sequence such that
fi ≡ µ
i (w) ￿w µ(w) ￿w µ
i−1 (w) for at least one w ∈ W.
25Stability of µ implies that
w / ∈ Ch(µ(fi) ∪ {w},qfi,￿fi). (3)
Nevertheless the algorithm speciﬁes10 that w ∈ Ch(µi−1 (fi) ∪ A
i−1
fi ,qfi,￿fi)
where w ∈ A
i−1
fi , the set of workers to whom the ﬁrms has never made
any oﬀer until iteration i − 1. Moreover, since until i − 1, µ ￿W µi−1 and
workers only improve along the sequence of matchings, then either workers
in µ(fi) are matched to fi at µi−1, or they did not receive any oﬀer from fi:
thus µ(fi) ⊆ µi−1 (fi)∪A
i−1
fi . By successive application of q-substitutability,
w ∈ Ch(µ(fi) ∪ {w},qfi,￿fi), a contradiction with (3).
Further, Proposition 3 states that, given a ﬁrm quasi-stable matching
µ￿, if workers do not agree on the ranking of two group-stable matchings
preferred by workers to µ￿, there exists another group-stable matching less
preferred by workers to the previous one and still preferred by workers to µ￿.
Proposition 3 Assume that ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences in (F,W,
q,￿). Let µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿) and µ1, µ2 ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) be such that
(1) µ1 ￿W µ￿, µ2 ￿W µ￿ and
(2) neither µ1 ￿W µ2 nor µ2 ￿W µ1.
Then, there exists µ3 ∈ GS (F,W,q,￿) such that µ1 ￿W µ3, µ2 ￿W µ3 and
µ3 ￿W µ￿.
Proof. Assume SO(µ￿) ￿W µ1 and SO(µ￿) ￿W µ2. Then ,setting µ3 =
SO(µ￿), the conclusion of the proposition hold since SO(µ￿) is group-stable
and SO(µ￿) ￿W µ￿. Without loss of generality, assume that either SO(µ￿) =
µ1 orSO(µ￿) ￿W µ1 (a symmetric argument will work replacing µ1 by µ2). By
hypothesis (2) there is at least one worker w who prefers SO(µ￿) to µ2, which
violates Proposition 2 since µ2 ￿W µ￿. Hence µ1 and µ2 are unanimously
preferred by workers to SO(µ￿). Since SO(µ￿) is group-stable and preferred
by workers to µ￿, the conclusion of the Proposition holds.
Proposition 4 characterizes the outcome of the SO Algorithm. It is the
worker-worst and ﬁrm-optimal matching in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿).
Proposition 4 Assume that ﬁrms have q-substitutable preferences in the
many-to-one market (F,W,q,￿) and let µ￿ ∈ FQS (F,W,q,￿). Then,
SO(µ￿) = ¯ µFS
µ￿




10See main iteration 1-2.
26Proof. By Proposition 3, there exists a group-stable matching in S
µ￿
W(F,W,
q,￿) worker-inferior to any other matchings in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿). Since all
workers improve along the sequence of matchings, SO(µ￿) ∈ S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿).
Moreover, SO(µ￿) = µ
WS
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿), otherwise Proposition 2 would not
hold. We have to prove that µ
WS
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) is preferred by all ﬁrms to
any other group-stable matching in S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿). Suppose that it is not
the case, i.e., there exists a matching µ1 ∈ S
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) such that for
one ﬁrm f, µ1 (f) ￿f µ
WS
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿)(f). Since all workers w in µ1 (f)
prefer f = µ1 (w) to their match under µ
WS
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿), they would form
blocking pairs of µ
WS
µ￿
W (F,W,q,￿) with f, which contradicts its group-
stability.
5 Concluding Remark
When the input matching is ﬁrm quasi-stable, Cantala (2004) shows that,
under q-substitutability of the preferences, all tentative matchings generated
by the S.O. algorithm are also ﬁrm quasi-stable. Thus, by Proposition 4, all
along the restabilization process, ﬁrms/ workers agree on which one is the
best/ worst achievable stable matching- achievability is captured by Propo-
sition 2. The consequence is that the order in which ﬁrms are picked to make
oﬀers would not depend on the order in which ﬁrms make oﬀers if they were
emitted sequentially instead of simultaneously.
There is no such agreement when preferences are not q-substitutable, as
shown in Example 6.
Example 6. Let the market (F,W,q,￿) be such that F = {f1,f2}, W =



















27The empty matching is ﬁrm quasi-stable, f1 and w2 prefer µ to µ￿ while f2, w1
and w3 prefer µ￿ to µ. If f1 is picked ﬁrst, f1 makes a joint oﬀer to {w1,w2},
which is accepted by both workers. Then f2 makes a joint oﬀer to the same
workers, which is rejected by w2. Finally f2 oﬀers to w3 and µ is reached. If
f2 is picked ﬁrst, µ￿ is reached in three iterations.
Finally, when a market is disrupted many times by the opening of posi-
tions and/or the retirement of workers, arguments from Blum et al. (1997)
extend easily to establish that the order in which disruptions and restabiliza-
tions of the market occur does not aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome of the algorithm.
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